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Global Economy

China and Latin America: Connected and Competing
By Kayla Chen & Xiangming Chen
The Global Rise of China
The rise of China has stolen more headlines than any other
global issue these days, stirring up questions about what
China’s growing prominence really means, and how – more
than why – it affects the world. While the rise of previous
global powers took decades, if not centuries, China’s rise has
been spectacularly fast and furious, considering the tremendous economic prowess it has gained over a relatively short
period of time. Accounting for approximately 2 percent of
the world’s total GDP around 1980, China holds almost 15
percent of world GDP in purchasing power parity today.
From a longer historical perspective, however, China has yet
to regain its dominant status in the world economy back in
1840 when it accounted for about a third of world GDP – the
largest among all countries at the time – before its protracted
economic decline in the aftermath of the two Opium Wars.
As China’s share of the world economy has grown larger, its
integration with global trade has also accelerated. According
to the Chinese government’s statistics,1 China’s share of global
trade rose from 4.7 percent in 2002 to 10.2 percent in 2011,
with its export share of the global total growing from 5 percent
to 10.4 percent. This rapid ascent has moved China from
fourth to first on the list of top trading nations. With an annual
growth rate of 21.8 percent since 2002, China moved up from
being the sixth largest importer in 2002 to the second in 2009,
and stayed there through 2012, only behind the United States.
Because China’s speed and intensity of economic growth and
global integration over the last three decades is historically
unprecedented, it is expected to encounter both concerns and
competition from other emerging economies, mainly in Asia
and Latin America.

From Old Allies to New Partners
Looking from the 1960s to the present, there has been both
continuity and change in China’s relations and position with
other developing countries. As a member of the old Third
World camp, China preached and practiced the ideology of
socialist, independent development with very limited international trade. At the same time, China provided development
assistance to a number of African and Latin American countries that shared that ideology, such as Tanzania and Chile,
whose socialist government under Allende was the first in Latin
America to recognize China in 1970 (although trade between
the two countries began as early as 1961). Between 1970 and
1975, China put up $500 million to build the Tanzania-Zambia
Railway, the largest single foreign-aid project undertaken by
China at the time. As part of this largely ideologically driven
project, China invited hundreds of railroad engineers from
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both countries to Beijing for training. The irony at the time
was that many of these engineers were the sons of government elites whom China treated as its “socialist brethren.”
Fast-forward to the first decade of the 21st century, and
China has expanded its small and ideologically imbued presence into considerably larger and market-oriented developing
economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China not only
has expanded trade and investment ties with many of these
economies, but also intensified efforts to target valuable commodities like oil, gas, metals and minerals. While continuing
to provide development assistance, often involving a larger
amount of resources to poor developing countries, China has
become a more powerful trader and investor, with a voracious
appetite for natural resources that are in short supply at home.
Relative to its interests in acquiring oil and gas in Central Asia
and parts of Africa, China’s economic relations with, and
interests in, Latin America are more varied and complex.

The Emerging China-Latin America Nexus
Trade between China and Latin American countries has
grown exponentially over the past decade. Although SinoLatin American trade continues to remain a relatively small
share of their respective global trade, growth has exceeded
many expectations. From 2000 to 2009, annual trade between
China and Latin American countries grew more than 1,200
percent, from $10 billion to $130 billion, according to United
Nations statistics.2
China has emerged as the largest export destination for
Brazil, Chile and Peru and the second largest export destination for Argentina, Costa Rica and Cuba. Overall trade with
Latin America is mainly driven by China’s need to fuel its
expanding economy and to feed its 1.34 billion people. Brazil,
Chile, Peru and Argentina – more than half of the Mercosur

group – are tremendously resource-rich.
For example, agricultural and mining
goods accounted for 83 percent of Latin
American exports to China between
2008 and 2009.3 Based on a recent World
Bank assessment of China’s impact on
Latin American economies, China’s
growing demand for South America’s
leading exports – copper, iron ore, oil
and soybeans – has had an undeniably
positive impact on the region’s export
growth. Nonetheless, growth has been
quite uneven across different countries
in Latin America. The Andean and
Southern Cone nations have reported
increases ranging from 9 to 14 percent
of their total exports, respectively. In
the case of Central American products,
China’s imports accounted for only
2 percent of Central America’s total
exports in 2004.4
The composition of Latin America’s
main exports to China – copper, iron
ore, oil and soybeans – reflects China’s
goal to strengthen its “strategic partnerships” with Argentina, Brazil and
Chile, due to the value of trade and
their regional influence. Economic ties
between these countries and China have
continued to deepen since China became
Chile’s largest export consumer in 2007
and Brazil’s largest trading partner in
2009.5 China’s rapid growth in trade
and investment in Brazil has helped to
fuel the Brazilian economy in a sluggish
global market. Yet, similar to the rest of
the region, Brazil exports primarily raw
commodities and imports manufactured
goods from China. In 2009, 77 percent
of Brazil’s exports to China consisted
of raw materials, mainly iron ore, soybeans and soy oil, while industrial products made up only 23 percent.6 In 2011,
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff
remarked, “There is a misbalance on
our relations with China. Brazil exports
commodities and imports too many
knick-knacks. I’m told that 80 percent
of this year’s Carnival costumes came
from China.”7
Argentina, which maintains a trade
surplus with China, exported a total
value of $5.15 billion to China in 2009.8
The surplus is mainly driven by its heavy

export of soy products. Between 2000
and 2009, 55 percent of Argentina’s
exports to China were soybeans, and
another 23 percent soy oil.9 Argentina
has also been a regional leader in forging
investment and technological cooperation with China. The establishment
of the Argentine-China debt swap in
February 2009, worth $10.2 billion, was
the first such deal in the region. China’s
investment in private Argentine companies has also grown. The China National
Offshore Oil Corporation’s purchase of
a $3.1 billion interest in Argentina’s
Bridas, and Sinopec’s $2.4 billion purchase of Occidental’s Argentine holdings put Argentina on par with Brazil,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela with
respect to China’s investment deals in
the region.10 Additional areas of cooperation between China and Argentina
are evident in military and space.
Argentina is one of only four Latin
American countries to have purchased
military vehicles from China, and one
of the few countries to cooperate with
China in space exploration. Argentina’s
nuclear agency, CONEA, has also discussed joint projects with major Chinese
telecommunications companies such as
Huawei and ZTE, which have a significant presence in Argentina.

that the Asian superpower is quickly
outcompeting them. In the short term
though, China’s demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from
Latin America. Since Latin American
countries and China have different
export structures, the former is not as
threatened by China’s rapid market
penetration as assumed, with the clear
exception of Mexico. According to
Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, “Mexico
is the only country in Latin America
whose comparative advantage has been
moving in the same direction as the
comparative advantage of [India and
China],” and faces strong commercial
competition.11 Interestingly though, the
head-to-head economic competition
between China and Mexico has shifted
around to either’s favor in turns.
Once upon a time, Mexico saw
China as a seemingly unmatchable
competitor in producing the same kinds
of cheap manufactured goods at a fraction of the cost. Now, for the first time
in a decade, Latin America’s second
largest economy has become a credible
challenger to China in manufacturing.
According to figures from the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database, Mexico accounted for 12.3

From 2000 to 2009, annual trade between China and Latin
American countries grew more than 1,200 percent, from $10
billion to $130 billion, according to United Nations statistics.
China’s growing economic influence in Argentina and the region may
become a concern to the receiving
parties. However, it will have no real
impact on the larger and more significant reality, which is that the Chinese
and Latin American economies are
already strongly connected, and will
become even more so through this
decade and beyond.

Competing from Afar
China’s stronger economic ties with
Latin America are generating concerns
in some Latin American countries

percent of all US non-oil imports in
2010. In 1999, prior to China’s emergence as the “world’s factory,” its share
was just 10.6 percent.12 The result of this
shifting landscape can seem counter-intuitive. Today, Chrysler is using Mexico
as a base to supply some of its Fiat
500s to the Chinese market. To mark
the company’s $500 million investment
in Mexico last year, former president,
Felipe Calderon, remarked, “I think it is
the first time that a Mexican vehicle, at
least in recent times, is to be exported to
China…we always thought it was going
to be the other way around.”13
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Other changes have taken place and paved the way for
Mexico’s new important role as a global manufacturer. Its
free trade agreements with 44 countries – more than twice
as many as China, and four times as many as Brazil – have
allowed companies based in Mexico to source external
inputs, often duty-free. Another significant shift improving Mexico’s competitive status is China’s rising labor
costs. For example, wages in southern China have gone up
by 20 percent a year over the last four years, and up 14
percent annually in Shanghai from 2002 to 2009, relative to
increases of 8 percent in the Philippines and only 1 percent
in Mexico.14 As a result, Mexican wages, which were 2.4
times those of China in 2002, are 14 percent higher now,
and will be lower than China’s faster rising wages in five
more years.15 Mexico is clearly back in the game of laborintensive competition with China.
Competing from across the Pacific Ocean for exports to
the United States, China certainly does not have Mexico’s
unique geographic advantage as a next-door neighbor.
According to Lorenza Martínez, Mexico’s Undersecretary
of the Economies Ministry, it takes between 20 days and
two months to ship goods from China to the United States,
whereas Mexican goods can reach their cross-border destinations between two to seven days. This makes a huge difference in cost savings and inventory reduction as just-in-time
manufacturing has become more popular with American
companies, especially since the 2008 economic recession.16
Distance matters a great deal to the overall competition
between China and Mexico for the United States, their most
important common market. However, it may not be sufficient to offset China’s greater advantages against Mexico
in its volume of exports and its spread and depth of global
supply chains.

A Win-Win Prospect?
With strong economic ties to multiple Latin American countries and direct competition with Mexico, China has growing
interests and stakes in the region today. Does this create the
impression of a hegemonic or even colonializing China, like
that of the Old World in Latin America? Challenging this
perception, Jiang Shixue, an influential Chinese scholar on
Latin America, has portrayed the bilateral relationship as
South-South cooperation. He cites China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), which constructed a school in the
city of Talala, Peru as an example of China taking up local
corporate social responsibility.17 One could also point to the
generally favorable terms of trade for both sides and China’s
absence of political intervention in Latin America as additional evidence for a mutually beneficial relationship. Against
this larger picture, China-Mexico’s export competition seems
to be an outlier.
Moving forward, there may be some uncertainty in SinoLatin American relations given the internal and external challenges surrounding China’s transition to more balanced and
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sustainable economic growth, a more egalitarian society and
the development of a more consistent foreign policy. Potential
slower economic growth will weaken China’s demand for
commodities from Latin America and reduce the latter’s vulnerability to export price volatility, although it will experience
a slowdown in export growth. Achieving higher levels of
domestic consumption will lighten China’s burden to compete
with a country like Mexico for manufactured exports. If China
can be convinced to be more flexible regarding territorial disputes (e.g. the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) and long-distance
fishing off South America’s coast, then China could be seen
by Latin American countries as the “soft power” on the peaceful rise that it claims.
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